description. Hence the need of pronoun and indices, and the more complicated the subject the greater the need of them. The introduction of indices into the algebra of logic is the greatest mnerit of Mr. Mitchell's system.* He writes F1 to mean that the proposition F is true of every object in the universe, and FE, to mean that the same is true of some object. This distinction can only be made in some such way as this. Indices are also required to show in what manner other signs are connected together. With these two kinds of signs alone any proposition can be expressed; but it cannot be reasoned upon, for reasoning consists in the observation that where certain relations subsist certain others are found, and it accordingly requires the exhibition of the relations reasoned with in an icon. It has long been a puzzle how it could be that, on the one hand, mathematics is purely deductive in its nature, and draws its conclusions apodictically, while on the other hand, it presents as rich and apparently unending a series of surprising discoveries as any observational science. Various have been the attempts to solve the paradox by breaking down one or other of these assertions, but without success. The truth, however, appears to be that all deductive reasoning, even simple syllogism, involves an element of observation; namely, deduction consists in constructing an icon or diagram the relations of whose parts shall present a complete analogy with those of the parts of the object of reasoning, of experimenting upon this image in the imagination, and of observing the result so as to discover unnoticed and hidden relations among the parts. For instance, take the syllogistic formula, All M is P S isM S is P. This is really a diagram of the relations of S, M, and P. The fact that the middle term occurs in the two premises is actually exhibited, and this must be done or the notation will be of no value. As for algebra, the very idea of the art is that it presents formulae which can be manipulated, and that by observing the effects of such manipulation we find properties not to be otherwise discerned. In such manipulation, we are guided by previous discoveries which are embodied in general formulae. These are patterns which we have the right to imitate in our procedure, and are the icons par excellence of algebra. The letters of applied algebra are usually tokens, but the x, y, z, etc. of a general formula, such as are blanks to be filled up with tokens, they are indices of tokens. Such a formula might, it is true, be replaced by an abstractly stated rule (say that multiplication is distributive); but no application could be made of such an abstract statement without translating it into a sensible image.
In this paper, I purpose to develope an algebra adequate to the treatment of all problems of deductive logic, showing as I proceed what kinds of signs have necessarily to be employed at each stage of the development. I shall thus attain three objects. The first is the extension of the power of logical algebra over the whole of its proper realm. The second is the illustration of principles which underlie all algebraic notation. The third is the enumeration of the essentially different kinds of necessary inference; for when the notation which suffices for exhibiting one inference is found inadequate for explaining another, it is clear that the latter involves an inferential element not present to the former. Accordingly, the procedure contemplated should result in a list of categories of reasoning, the interest of which is not dependent upon the algebraic way of considering the subject. I shall not be able to perfect the algebra sufficiently to give facile methods of reaching logical conclusions: I can only give a method by which any legitimate conclusion may be reached and any fallacious one avoided. But I cannot doubt that others, if they will take up the subject, will succeed in giving the notation a form in which it will be highly useful in mathematical work. I even hope that what I have done may prove a first step toward the resolution of one of the main problems of logic, that of producing a method for the discovery of methods in mathematics.
11.-Non-relative Logic. According to ordinary logic, a proposition is either true or false, and no further distinction is recognized. This is the descriptive conception, as the geometers say; the metric conception would be that every proposition is more or less false, and that the question is one of amount. At present we adopt the former view.
Let propositions be represented by quantities. Let v and f be two constant values, and let the value of the quantity representing a proposition be v if the proposition is true and be f if the proposition is false. Thus, x being a proposition, the fact that x is either true or false is written (x f)(V-x) = 0. The choice of v = 1, f = 0, is agreeable to the received measurement of probabilities. But there is no need, and many times no advantage, in measuring probabilities in this way. I presume that Boole, in the formation of his algebra, at first considered the letters as denoting propositions or events. As he presents the subject, they are class-names; but it is not necessary so to regard them. Take, for example, the equation t = n + hf, which might mean that the body of taxpayers is composed of all the natives, together with householding foreigners. We might reach the signification by either of the following systems of notation, which indeed differ grammatically rather than logically. There is no index to show who the " He " of the second system is, but that makes no difference. To say that he is a taxpayer is equivalent to saying that he is a native or is a householder and a foreigner. In this point of view, the constants 1 and 0 are simply the probabilities, to one who knows, of what is true and what is false; and thus unity is conferred upon the whole system. For my part, I prefer for the present not to assign-determinate values to f and v, nor to identify the logical operations with any special arithmetical ones, leaving myself free to do so hereafter in the manner which may be found most convenient. Besides, the whole system of importing arithmetic into the subject is artificial, and modern Boolians do not use it. The -algebra of logic should be self-developed, and arithmetic should spring out of logic instead of reverting to it. Going back to the beginning, let the writing of a letter by itself mean that a certain proposition is true. This letter is a token. There is a general understanding that the actual state of things or some other is referred to. This understanding must have been established by means of an index, and to rome extent dispenses with the need of other indices. The denial of a proposition will be made by writing a line over it.
I have elsewhere shown that the fundamental and primary mode of relation between two propositions is that which we have -expressed by the form
We shall write this x -< y, which is also equivalent to (x -f)(v -y) = 0. It is stated above that this means "if x is true, y is true.." But this meaning is greatly modified by the circumstance that only the actual state of things is referred to.
To make the matter clear, it will be well to begin by defining the meaning of a hypothetical proposition, in general. What the usages of language may be does not concern us; language has its meaning modified in technical logical formulae as in other special kinds of discourse. The question is what is the sense which is most usefully attached to the hypothetical proposition in logic? Now, the peculiarity of the hypothetical proposition is that it goes out beyond the actual state of things and declares what would happen were things other than they are or may be. The utility of this is that it puts us in possession of a rule, say that "if A is true, B is true," such that should we hereafter learn something of which we are now ignorant, namely that A is true, then, by virtue of this rule, we shall find that we know something else, namely, that B is true. There can be no doubt that the Possible, in its primary meaning, is that which may be true for aught we know, that whose falsity we do not know. The purpose is subserved, then, if, throughout the whole range of possibility, in every state of things in which A is true, B is true too. The hypothetical proposition may therefore be falsifiedhby a single state of things, but only by one in which A is true while B is false. States of things in which A is false, as well as those in which B is true, cannot falsify it., If, then, B is a proposition true in every case throughout the whole range of possibility, the hypothetical proposition, taken in its logical sense, ought to be regarded as true, whatever may be the usage of ordinary speech. If, on the other hand, A is in no case true, throuighout the range of possibility, it is a matter of indifference whether the hypothetical be understood to be true or not, since it is useless. But it will be more simple to class it among true propositions, because the cases in which the antecedent is false do not, in any other case, falsify a hypothetical. This, at any rate, is the meaning which I shall attach to the hypothetical proposition in general, in this paper.
The range of possibility is in one case taken wider, in another larrower; in the present case it is limited to the actual state of things. Here, therefore, the proposition a-< b is true if a is false or if b is true, but is false if a is true while b is false. But though we limit ourselves to the actual state of things, yet when we find that a formula of this sort is true by logical necessity, it becomes applicable to any single state of things throughout the range of logical possibility. For example, we shall see that from x -< y we can infer z -< x. This does not mean that because in the actual state of things x is true and y false, therefore in every state of things either z is false or x true; but it does mean that in whatever state of things we find x true and y false, in that state of things either z is false or xis true. In that sense, it is not limited to the actual state of thiings, but extends to any single state of things.
The first icon of algebra is contained in the formula of identity X-< X.
This formula does not of itself justify any transformation, any inference. It only justifies our continuing to .hold what we have held (though we may, for instance, forget how we were originally justified in holding it).
The second icon is contained in the rule that the several antecedents of a consequentia may be transposed; that is, that from x-< (Y-< Z)
we can pass to y-< (x-< z). This is stated in the formula l'S -< (Y -<s z) I -<}Y -< (x -< Z)} Because this is the case, the brackets may be omitted, and we may write y -< x -< z. 
By the formula of identity

This is the same as to say that if in any state of things x is true, and if the proposition " if x, then y" is true, then in that state of things y is true. This is the modus ponens of hypothetical inference, and is the most rudimentary form of reasoning.
To say that (x -< x) is generally true is to say that it is so in every state of things, say in that in which y is true; so that we may write y -< (x -< x), and then, by transposition of antecedents, x -< (y -< x), or from x we may infer y-< x.
The third icon is involved in the principle of the transitiveness of the copula, which is stated in the formula (x -< Y) -< (y -< z) -< x -< z.
According to this, if in any case y follows from x and z from y, then z follows from x. This is the principle of the syllogism in Barbara.
We have already seen that from x follows y -< x. Hence, by the transitiveness of the copula, if from y -< x follows z, then from x follows z, or from The original notation x -<y served without modification to express the pure formula of identity. An enlargement of the conception of the notation so as to make the terms themselves complex was required to express the principle of the transposition of antecedents; and this new icon brought out new propositions. The third icon introduces the image of a chain of consequence. We must now again enlarge the notation so as to introduce negation. We have already seen that if a is true, we can write x -< a, whatever x may be. Let b be such that we can write b -< x whatever x may be. Then b is false. We have here a fourthi icon, which gives a new sense to several formulae. Thus the principle of the interchange of antecedents is that from x -< (y -< z)
we can infer y-< (X-< z). Since z is any proposition we please, this is as much as to say that if from the truth of x the falsity of y follows, then from the truth of y the falsity of x follows.
Again the formula x -< { (x -< y) -< y I is seen to mean that from x we can infer that anything we please follows from that things following from x, and a fortiori from everything following from x. This is, therefore, to say that from x follows the falsity of the denial of X; which is the principle of contradiction. Again the formula of the transitiveness of the copula, or We might dispense with the fifth and eighth species of signs-the devices * It is interesting to observe that this reasoning is dilemmatic. In fact, the dilemma involves the fifth icon. The dilemma was only introduced into logic from rhetoric by the humanists of the renaissance; and at that time logic was studied with so little accuracy that the peculiar nature of this mode of reasoning escaped notice. I was thus led to suppose that the whole non-relative logic was derivable from the principles of the ancient syllogistic, and this error is involved in Chapter II of my paper in the third volume of this Journal. My friend, Professor Schr6der, detected the mistake and showed that the distributive formulas (a + y) z -< xz + yz (x z)(Y+z) -< xy+z could not be deduced from syllogistic principles. I had myself independently discovered and virtually stated the same thing. In this method, we introduce the two special tokens of second intention f and v, we retain two indices of tokens x and y, and we have a somewhat complex icon, with a special prescription for its use.
A better method may be found as follows. We have seen that x < (y -< z) may be conveniently written -< y -< z; while (x< y) -< z ought to retain the parenthesis. Let us extend this rule, so as to be more general, and hold it necessary always to include the antecedent in parenthesis. We may further write for x < y, x + y implying that X + y is an antecedent for whatever consequent may be taken, and the vinculum becomes identified with the sign of negation. We may also use the sign of multiplication as an abbreviation, putting xy = 7 + Y= x-< . This subjects addition and multiplication to all the rules of ordinary algebra, and also to the following:
y+x-x-y y(x+x)-y
x + x -VX xzf xy + z= (x + z)(y + z).
To any proposition we have a right to add any expression at pleasure; also to strike out any factor of any term. The expressions for different propositions separately known may be multiplied together. These are substantially Mr. Mitchell's rules of procedure. Thus the premises of Barbara are + y and y+z. Multiplying these, we get (x + y)(y + z) =xy + yz. Dropping y and y we reach the conclusion x + z.
III.-First-intentional Logic of Relatives.
The algebra of Boole affords a language by which anything may be expressed which can be said without speaking of more than one individual at a time. It is true that it can assert that certain characters belong to a whole class, but only such characters as belong to each individual separately. The logic of relatives considers statements involving two and more individuals at once. Indices are here required. Taking, first, a degenerate form of relation, we may write xiyj to signify that x is true of the individual i while y is true of the individual j. If z be a relative character zi0 will signify that i is in that relation to j. In this way we can express relations of considerable complexity. In this notation is involved a sixth icon. We now come to the distinction of some and all, a distinction which is precisely on a par with that between truth and falsehood; that is, it is descriptive, not mnetrical.
In the same way, Hli x means that x is true of all these individuals, or fli Xi-xi Xij Xk, etc. If x is a simple relation, Hi Hj x-j means that every i is in this relation to every j, ;i-j xj that some one i is in this relation to every j, njHXfx0 that to every j some i or other is in this relation, E*EZxjj that some i is in this relation to some j. It is to be remarked that ;ixi and H1ixi are only similar to a sum and a product; they are not strictly of that nature, because the individuals of the universe may be innumerable.
At this point, the reader would perhaps not otherwise easily get so good a conception of the notation as by a little practice in translating from ordinary language into this system and back again. Let l,j mean that i is a lover of j, and bij that i is a benefactor of j. Then Hi ;j la; bij means that everything is at once a lover and a benefactor of something; and 1i j Ij} bji that everything is a lover of a benefactor of itself. 
